Quantum-Aware Software Defined Networks by Aguado Martín, Alejandro et al.
Quantum-Aware Software Defined Networks
A. Aguado1, V. Martin2, D. Lopez3, M.Peev4, J. Martinez-Mateo2, J.L. Rosales2,
F. de la Iglesia3, M. Gomez3, E. Hugues-Salas1, A. Lord5, R. Nejabati1 and D. Simeonidou1
1High Performance Networks, University of Bristol, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB. UK
2Center for Computational Simulation - UPM. Campus de Montegancedo. Boadilla del Monte, 28660 Madrid. Spain
3Telefo´nica Investigacio´n y Desarrollo, Ronda de la Comunicacio´n s/n 28050 Madrid. Spain
4Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH, Riesstrasse 25, 80992 Munchen. Germany
5 Optical Research Unit, British Telecom, UK
(a.aguado@bristol.ac.uk, vicente@fi.upm.es, diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com, momtchil.peev@huawei.com)
Abstract—Software Defined Networks (SDN) represent a major
paradigm change in communications networks. It provides a level of
abstraction and independence from the traditional networking practice
that allows for a fast path of innovation and, specifically, opens new
opportunities for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks. In this
contribution we explore the implications of this paradigm for the deploy-
ment of QKD in practice from the point of view of telecommunications’
providers, network equipment manufacturers and applied research and
development. We propose a generic quantum-aware SDN architecture
and two applications, a generic end to end encryption one and other for
the network infrastructure itself.
Quantum Key Distribution is a difficult technology. Beyond its
intrinsic point to point nature, the creation, transmission and detec-
tion of quantum signals impose very stringent requirements on the
physical implementation. This is difficult already in the typical point
to point links over which most of QKD research has been done and
it gets worse in the case of QKD networks, where new requirements,
such as addressability, physical media sharing between classical and
quantum channels or the use of common infrastructure come into
play. The last items also imply that now losses and noise in the
channel are even more relevant, since the quantum channel has to pass
through optical devices that are common in the nowadays prevalent
paradigm of passive optical networks. These issues have been studied
in many networks and testbeds [1]–[3] but although the limits and
restrictions are now reasonably well understood, a full integration of
QKD in a telecommunication network is still an open problem.
Two QKD Network architectures have been put forward, one being
the switched QKD Network, where uninterrupted and non-amplified,
point to point optical paths supporting a quantum channel are created
in a passive optical network. This architecture allows for end to end
Information Theoretically Secure (ITS) links, but is heavily penalized
by the absorptions in the path through the optical components in the
network, thus limiting its applicability to metropolitan areas. The
other QKD Network architecture paradigm is that of the trusted node
(repeater) network, in which the end to end paths cross intermediate
nodes where the quantum channel ends and the key material is
extracted and used to create node to node secure communication
connections. By chaining these with as many trusted nodes as needed,
the distance limitation is avoided at the expense of the security
of the end to end key material. This is still ITS albeit with the
additional assumption that all intermediate nodes are trustworthy.
Without quantum repeaters, this is actually the only way to solve
the absorption problem and allow quantum key generation that is not
limited by distance.
From a practical network perspective, however, neither option is
actually a good one. Both architectures pose in practice a problem
of running two separate networks in parallel (the classical commu-
nication and the QKD one) and not integrating the quantum and
classical channels into a single one. In the case of a trusted node
network, actually the only real contact point between these two is at
the application level, when the keys produced in the quantum network
are handled to be used in the classical communication one. A common
management can be expected only when, like in a switched network,
a physical link (i.e: a strand of fiber) is shared for quantum and
classical purposes, but then the management is usually an ad-hoc
choice of wavelengths and power such that the noise in the quantum
channel is minimized. Otherwise, the QKD and the classical networks
can be seen as completely separated ones. This makes a large scale
deployment of quantum networks non-practical, since either many
devices in an optical network need to be modified (e.g.: quantum
aware ROADMs, OLTs, ONTs, switches, etc.) and made mutually
compatible, as is the case in classical communications, or a separated
quantum network has to be deployed and run in parallel.
Fig. 1. General structure of an SDN network depicting the three main layers:
infrastructure, control/management and application. The QKD devices will
be installed within the infrastructure layer. A control/management layer will
oversee the infrastructure using a common set of open protocols. From a
QKD perspective (and from a more general network evolution perspective)
this decoupling allows to develop a true integration of QKD in networks:
neither the devices are required to comply with the requirements of other,
classical, appliances nor classical appliances have to be necessarily aware of
quantum devices. Their functionality and coordination is managed in software
by the upper layer depending on the functionality exposed by the devices in
the infrastructure layer.
Software Defined Networks separate the control and data planes.
Fig. 1 shows the canonical diagram of SDN networks. A lower
layer, the data plane, composed of forwarding elements (either sw
components or physical devices) is abstracted to the upper layers
that control the flow of data (and services) in a centralized way.
This logically centralized control/management plane uses open
interfaces to access the elements in the data plane. This plane provides
a set of APIs to applications managing network behavior and services,
or to end-user applications willing to use and shape the services they
require from the network.
The elements in the data plane can also provide control functions
beyond pure switching or forwarding, so that a dynamic environment
is set up such that a manufacturer can add new functionality and
expose it to the controller/manager that, in turn, can easily evolve to
accommodate this new functionality. As compared with the traditional
approach, where the network configuration and management inter-
faces are typically proprietary and tied to a specific manufacturer, this
represents a revolution that opens the network to potentially disruptive
technologies like QKD and quantum technologies in general. More
over, the SDN model is currently being widely and quickly adopted
in communications networks.
Under this new paradigm of software-based centralized control of
network state the integration of QKD is, in principle, much more
easy since:
• It can be made explicit to the control plane (i.e: as a new service,
on equal footing with many others, either supported natively
by the network control protocol or introduced thanks to the
protocols extension capabilities) that then can manage its special
characteristics in a centralized way for the whole network or part
of it.
• The entry point for the manufacturers is unique: it is only the
device that they manufacture. There is no need for other network
devices to be “quantum-aware”. The controller manages the
special requirements and their interactions, taken into account
their capabilities.
• The specific data that QKD produces -keys- can be managed
by the control plane itself (e.g. if it is a “forwarding key” or
keys to secure the control plane) or handled to another entity
(e.g. a key manager, that is seen as an northbound App from the
control plane perspective) transparently.
• From a telecommunication point of view, the controller runs
inside a trusted domain (a secured environment from the physical
and logical point of view), hence using these nodes as trusted
repeaters does not involve an extra security assumption. How-
ever, different QoS can be still distinguished (ITS when a direct
link is available and ITS with additional trust assumptions when
key forwarding is required) and managed accordingly.
• There is no need to deploy a full quantum network. It can be
installed in an incremental way without problems. The upfront
cost is greatly reduced.
• The quantum part of the network can be upgraded to new
technologies when available (e.g. quantum repeaters can be
installed instead of forwarding devices) easily and independently
of other network devices.
• More optical paths are available, hence opening the possibility
to use network coding techniques to increase the security (e.g.
several paths have to be compromised at the same time)
• An hybrid usage of quantum and classical crypto techniques can
be easily implemented.
• From an operator perspective, the integration of SDN into a
QKD network could reduce CAPEX, as the deployment of a
QKD pair for each point-to-point (p2p) won’t be necessary if a
transmitter can be ’time-shared’ among different receivers and,
therefore, the number of QKD devices could be reduced.
Beyond this, an important case in point is the fact that the network
itself can be a user of the QKD keys. The fact that authentication
is granted after a first correct installation of a QKD device and
that an attacker must be continuously attacking the network after a
breach to ensure subsequent key possession (forward and backward
security) are desirable characteristics to secure the control plane. A
continuous flow of symmetric keys is also very convenient to secure
data plane workloads in specific network paradigms, from generic
p2p encryption services to the new architectural concept of network
function virtualization (NFV), which intends the deconstruction of
current network appliances (routers, firewalls, etc.) into specific
network functions implemented as software images running on a
homogenous infrastructure. This adds a new set of problems for the
network security that can be alleviated by pools of symmetric keys,
which are quite convenient to serve the high encryption bandwidth
that is needed (e.g.: virtual image distribution, VNF attestation). A
scheme of this use case is described in Fig. 2
Fig. 2. Architecture for the Network Function Virtualization use case. A NFV
orchestrator, the entity that manages all virtualized images in the network, is
connected to several datacenters (that provide the servers and connectivity for
the network services that will be implemented by the VNFs) through an end to
end encryption service. This implies inter-datacenter quantum connectivity to
share symmetric keys with the orchestrator. These keys can be used to encrypt
and authenticate critical data in the network (e.g. routing tables, firewall
information, VNF images... ) that would allow various network services (e.g.
a distributed router), image installation, attestation, etc.
The usage of SDN technologies to build a unified classical-
quantum network will enable more flexibility and reduce the cost
of deployment and management of the quantum channels. The
combination of these two technologies has to be seen as a mutually
beneficial arrangement. Enabling the secure working of the network
control plane or a NFV infrastructure, which is a clear advantage
to their operation, is possible when a continuous supply of secure
key material is available. Simultaneously, QKD can be seen as a
new opportunity for the operators and infrastructure providers as it
can enable the provision of new, high security encryption end-to-end
services. In this context, a network device with quantum capabilities
should be able to expose to the control plane, beyond a standard
interface and through an open one, these additional characteristics.
In our case, those related to QKD are:
• Generate keys to perform symmetric encryption using quantum
key distribution.
• Expose key IDs to network controllers and/or applications
(northbound interface)
• Perform switching and inline encryption.
Note that we do not consider at this stage of the development the
access from the control/management plane to lower level functionality
of the QKD card, like specific parameters of the protocol being per-
formed (e.g.: decoy states parameters for a card performing BB84).
We are rather assuming that the device brings some intelligence to
adapt these when the characteristics of the quantum channel changes
(e.g. in the case of the switching). Also, although inline encryption
is not strictly required, it is the kind of functionality that is very
convenient to have directly accessible. In any case, note that the
versatility of the SDN model makes these interfaces relatively easy
to evolve.
Bringing quantum encryption awareness and the capability of
providing inline encryption into a logically centralized control plane
will require a modification of the existing protocols and to develop
some necessary extensions, in particular to perform routing and status
dissemination. Note that although the SDN model is being adopted
at a very fast pace, there is not yet a unified and standardized set
of protocols to solve all problems in the network. Of particular
interest to QKD is the routing and status dissemination that nowadays,
depending on the type of network, is performed by different set of
protocols. In this sense, to start as soon as possible with, at least, a
minimal and functional set of modifications enabling quantum aware
SDN networks is important to have a real chance. Fig. 3 shows two
integration possibilities of end to end encryption services using QKD.
Fig. 3. Two SDN node architecture examples for the end to end encryption
using QKD case. Note how the SDN agent is a client to the QKD system,
using symmetric keys produced by QKD devices. To the upper layers this
allows to view the infrastructure layer with QKD in the same way that a
VPN is seen: all data travelling through the selected classical channels is
seamlessly cyphered, without having to work out any ad-hoc compatibility
solution.
A huge effort aiming to standardise different protocols and models
for network management is currently underway. Some legacy net-
works are functional using GMPLS as the protocol suite to exchange
link reachability information and provide path configuration over the
network. Apart from GMPLS, those that we consider more relevant to
the QKD case include YANG, that has been pushed as the dominant
model for networking, providing an structure than can be used to
define NETCONF [4] (xml/rpc-based) interfaces. OpenFlow [5] has
also gained a lot of popularity among the SDN community. Even
though it was originally defined as a protocol for the packet domain,
it is also popular in domains such as optical and wireless and the last
versions contains the definition of experimental fields, thus facilitating
the extensions to include new capabilities.
The fundamental point is to make QKD services available to the
control plane. For this, extensions allowing the following features are
required:
• Features dissemination, in the shape of node capabilities (rpc-
reply to a hello message in NETCONF, features-reply in Open-
flow) or link reachability information (ISIS, OSPF-TE, BGPLS).
• Inline encryption flow configuration. YANG will require a model
definition. Openflow will need flow-mod extension. GMPLS
protocols will need explicit route object structure and manage-
ment modification.
• Key ID streaming to the control plane. Several mechanisms
could be implemented here (using rpc-reply in NETCONF, in
Openflow barrier synchronization and flow-stats action field
extension, and inline injection of the key in the RSVP path
message.) or even the inclusion of a key management system.
Note that these extensions have to be also supported from the QKD
device side, that has to export the appropriate features. Note also that
these extensions can have impact beyond the network itself in the
sense that there are also direct security applications. For example, a
trusted repeater could be built keeping the actual key inside the QKD
device as long as it has the ability to manage two quantum channels.
Forwarding managed by the control plane and a database of key IDs
would be enough for the key forwarding operation. Actual keys will
be only delivered to the applications at the endpoints.
The combination of SDN and QKD technologies is just starting,
the definition and development of these protocols will be an enabler
for operators to offer and capitalize new encrypted network services
powered by QKD technologies and automated from a logically
centralized control plane. This opens the road for a real convergence
of quantum and classical networks. QKD as we know it today is
just the starting point, but the SDN model allows for the evolution
and adaptation of other capabilities and devices, like the yet to come
quantum repeaters.
BRIEF GLOSSARY.
BGPLS : Border Gateway Protocol with Link State (LS) extensions.
GMPLS : General Multiprotocol Label Switching. Encapsulation
technique for fast data routing avoiding routing tables.
ISIS : Intermediate System to Intermediate System routing protocol.
NETCONF : Network Configuration Protocol.
NVF : Network Function Virtualization.
OpenFlow : Communications protocol to access the forwarding
plane of the network devices (switches, routers...). It is a key SDN
enabler.
OSPF-TE: Open Shortest Path First routing protocol for Traffic
Engineering. Used to describe the topology of a network.
SDN : Software defined network.
VNF : Virtualized Network Function. Describes an instance of a
software image performing a network function in the NVF paradigm.
YANG : Yet Another Next Generation. Data modeling language for
NETCONF.
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